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Abstract Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic
accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them
Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no
normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble
for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while ini-
tially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will
see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have
considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat
Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy
View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an
uncomfortable skeptical threat.
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1 Introduction
Many epistemologists have embraced the idea that epistemic justification amounts
to something along the lines of high probability. On this popular picture, there exists
some epistemic good-making feature—e.g. an agent’s total body of evidence or the
general reliability of a belief-forming process—and a belief that P is justified in so
far as P’s degree of probability, given the relevant good-making feature, is above
some threshold required for justification. Let’s call this Lockean picture of
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justification, the Threshold View.1 For our current purposes we can characterize
threshold views by their shared commitment to the following thesis.
Threshold Thesis The belief that P is justified for S iff P is highly probable for S.2
What makes threshold views so popular is that justification is almost universally
believed to come in degrees and to be fallible, i.e. to require less than probability 1.
With these two commitments in place, there is something very natural about the idea
that epistemic justification must amount to something along the lines of high
probability.3 However, a well-known challenge for threshold views is that they are
incompatible with the following intuitively compelling and attractive principle of
multi premise closure.
Multi Premise Closure (MPC) If S is justified in believing p and S is justified in
believing q… and S is justified in believing n, then S is justified in believing the
conjunction (p & q… n).
Threshold views (for any threshold value t\ 1) force us to give up (MPC) because
they face the problem of risk accumulation: as one begins conjoining individually
justified beliefs, the error risk associated with each conjunct accumulates and
eventually the probability of the conjunction can fall below the threshold required
for justification.
Motivated primarily by the incompatibility of threshold views with (MPC),
epistemologists have become increasingly interested in exploring alternatives to the
probabilistic picture. The idea is simple: if threshold views of justification are not
compatible with (MPC), then maybe relocating the source of epistemic justification
to something other than high probability will allow us to avoid this problem.
The perhaps most promising alternative to the probabilistic picture is a new
family of views, which I will call Normalcy Views.4 Normalcy Views of justification
turn their back on probabilistic considerations and instead explain justification in
terms of what is normal on one’s evidence. Broadly speaking we may characterize
Normalcy Views by their shared commitment to the following thesis.
Normalcy Thesis (NT) The belief that P is justified for S only if, given
S’s evidence E, there does not exist a single normal world in which S falsely beliefs
that P.
1 Threshold views of justification have been defended by a wide range internalists as well as externalists.
For examples, see Goldman (1979), Bonjour (1985: 6), Alston (1988: 269), Moser (1989: 42), Foley
(1992), Plantinga (1993: 18), Swinburne (2001), Conee and Feldman (2004: 100), Pryor (2004: 352),
Bergmann (2006: ch. 6) and Sturgeon (2008).
2 The Threshold Thesis is essentially a justification analogue of the well known Lockean Thesis, which
explains rational belief in terms of rational degrees of belief or credences.
Lockean Thesis It is rational for you to believe p just in case it is rational for you to have degree of
confidence y in p, where y[ x. (Foley 1992: 112).
3 A similar observation about the apparent naturalness of a probabilistic conception of justification can be
found in Smith (2016: 29).
4 For the two leading versions, see Smith (2010, 2016) and Leplin (2009).
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Unlike the Threshold Views, Normalcy Views are able to preserve (MPC) as they
avoid the problem of risk accumulation: Since for any belief to be justified there
cannot exist a normal world in which the belief is false, there will also be no normal
world in which a conjunction of these beliefs is false; After all, a normal world in
which the conjunction is false would require a normal world in which one of its
conjuncts is false and this possibility is ruled out by Normalcy Views. Furthermore,
Normalcy Views are also able to preserve our fallibilist intuitions: a belief can be
justified yet false as long as the world in which S falsely beliefs that P fails to be
normal. This puts Normalcy Views in the unique position of being able to
accommodate both (MPC) as well as our fallibilist intuitions. As such it is worth to
consider these views in more detail and to subject them to critical scrutiny.
This paper aims to raise some trouble for Normalcy Views by arguing that they
give rise to problematic notions of epistemic defeat. In the next section I will briefly
present the two leading Normalcy Views: Smith’s Normic Support Account and
Leplin’s Normic Reliabilism. I then argue that both accounts face the same problem
of being highly sensitive to defeating evidence, which results in justification being
lost much too easily—I will call this the Easy-Defeat Problem. Finally I argue that
since the problem is structural in nature there is little hope that other views
following (NT) will be able to avoid this problem. In the end it appears that there are
good reasons for rejecting the central claim of Normalcy Views: that in order for a
belief to be justified it is necessary that there does not exist a single normal world in
which S falsely believes that P.
2 The two leading proposals
As presented above, (NT) only provides the general contours, or the modal shape, of
a more complete theory. The details of how to best understand the modal constraint
proposed by (NT) can be developed in different ways. There are currently two
leading proposals on the market.
The first one is due to Martin Smith who recently proposed an account of
justification according to which a belief that P is justified only if the evidence E
normically supports P—i.e. if given ones evidence, P is true in all the normal
worlds. Let’s call this the Normic Support Account.
Normic Support Account In order for one to have justification for believing a
proposition P, it is necessary that one’s body of evidence E normically support P—it
is necessary that all the most normal worlds in which E is true are worlds in which P
is true. (2016, p. 42)5
5 Formally, Smith expresses the account as follows. Let E! P represent ‘E normically supports P’ and
let N w be a function ‘‘carrying information about the comparative normalcy of possible worlds from the
perspective of w’’ (Smith 2016: 137). The notion of normic support can now be expressed as follows.
Normic Support Account Formal E! P is true at w 2W iff either (1) there is a sphere N 2 N w such
that N is E-permitting and every E-world in N is a P-world or (2) there is no sphere N 2 N w such that N
is E-permitting. (137).
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As we can see, in the Normic Support Account the modal constrained presented
by (NT) is cashed out via a specific notion of evidential support called normic
support.
A very different way of developing (NT) can be found in recent work by Jarrett
Leplin. According to Leplin a belief is justified only if it was reliably produced;
where reliably produced means produced using a belief-forming method that is
perfectly reliable under normal conditions. More precisely, for Leplin a belief is
justified only if (i) it was produced by a method that is perfectly reliable under
normal conditions and (ii) the believer has no reason to believe that conditions are
abnormal (2009: 43).6 In spelling out what it means for a belief-forming method to
be perfectly reliable, Leplin draws on modal considerations inspired by Nozick’s
notion of sensitivity. According to Leplin, ‘‘[a] method of belief-formation is
reliable if it would not produce or sustain false beliefs under normal conditions. If a
belief is produced or sustained by a reliable method under normal conditions, then
were this belief to have been false, the process would not, under those conditions,
have produced or sustained it’’ (35). For our purposes, Leplin’s account of
justification (henceforth Normic Reliabilism) might be presented as follows.
Normic Reliabilism In order for S to have justification for believing a proposition
P, it is necessary that S’s belief was reliably produced—it is necessary that (i) the
belief that P was produced by a belief-forming method M that would not, in any
normal world, produce the belief that P if P were false and (ii) that the believer has
no reason to believe that conditions are abnormal.
We can see that there are considerable differences in how the two leading
Normalcy Views develop (NT). While the Normic Support Account accommodates
the modal constraint proposed by (NT)’s via a special notion of evidential support,
Normic Reliabilism accommodates (NT)’s modal constraint via a particular notion
of reliable belief-production.7 But, we will see that despite these differences both
accounts turn out to be problematic.
In the next two sections I argue that the Normic Support Account is
unsatisfactory because it gives rise to an account of epistemic defeat on which
beliefs lose their justificatory status much too easily. I then argue that the same
problem befalls Normic Reliabilism.
6 Leplin argues for a third condition, namely that the belief-forming method must be used intentionally.
This condition is intended to address the Generality Problem. Since I am not concerned with this issue
here I will, in the interest of simplicity, ignore this detail.
7 Interestingly, despite the considerable differences between Smith’s Normic Support Account and
Leplin’s Normic Reliabilism it is very difficult to think of a case in which the two theories make
diverging predictions. As an interesting working hypothesis it might be suggested that the two theories are
extensionally equivalent.
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3 Normic support
According to the Normic Support Account a belief is justified only if it is normically
supported by the evidence. What does it mean for a body of evidence to normically
support a proposition?
Informally, a body of evidence E normically supports a proposition P only if, given
the evidence E, it would call for special explanation if P turned out to be false (Smith
2016: 40). To illustrate, consider some paradigmatic instances of justified beliefs. For
example, suppose a subject wrongly forms a belief based on perceptual evidence (e.g.
that the car in front of her is red). Smith suggests that this case would call out for a
special explanation; some mitigating or interfering circumstances must have obtained
to explain why a belief based on perception would fail to be true. Such circumstances
might include hallucinations, unfortunate lighting, or deception by a malevolent
demon, etc. Similar considerations will of course apply to beliefs based on testimony
or memory. Cases in which a belief based on testimony turns out to be false would
require some sort of special explanation, e.g. intentional deception by the testifier, a
testifier misremembering the facts, mishearing by the receiver, etc. Informally then,
for a belief to be normically supported by the evidence, it has to be the case that if the
belief turned out to be false, some special explanation would be required.
To turn the notion of normic support into a more formal notion, Smith ties the
notion of ‘calling for an explanation’ to the notion of normality. Events that are
normal, so the thought goes, do not call for special explanations, while events that are
abnormal do call for special explanations. This allows Smith to provide an analysis of
‘normic support’ in terms of normal possible worlds.8 Beliefs that are normically
supported by the evidence will normally be true—i.e. they will be true in normal
worlds. Smith captures this idea in the following modal account of normic support:
Normic Support Modal A body of evidence E normically supports a proposition
P just in case P is true in all the most normal worlds in which E is true (Smith 2016:
42).9
8 More precisely, ‘calling for an explanation’ becomes a function carrying information about the
comparative normalcy of possible worlds.
9 In order to get the modal account of normic supports off the ground, we need to grant that worlds can be
ranked according to their comparative normalcy. Smith (2016: 42) is explicit about this assumption and I
will not challenge it here. In a recent review of Smith’s (2016) book, Anderson (2017) put pressure on this
claim by suggesting that Smith’s analysis of the notion of normic support is not sufficiently precise to
convince us that comparative normalcy rankings are indeed possible; ‘‘The main shortcoming of the book
is that the core notion is not given sufficient analysis. Normic support is, prima facie, an intuitive notion.
Unfortunately, Smith leaves too much to our intuitive grasp…a detailed account of what the notion could
do for us is inadequate without a solid grasp of the notion itself.’’ While this may be a good objection,
here is something we can say in reply. It is widely accepted that for any given world we can determine
what the close or relevantly similar possible worlds are. In other words, it is widely assumed that worlds
can be ranked according to their comparative similarity or closeness—accounts of sensitivity (Nozick
1981), safety (Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000), and epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005) all rely on this
assumption. However, it is not at all clear that we have a less intuition based or more principled method
for making these types of comparative judgments. As a result, I am inclined to think that we should be
charitable and grant Smith the assumption that worlds can be ranked according to their comparative
normalcy.
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This account of normic support combined with the claim that a belief is justified
only if it is normically supported by the evidence yields the full Normic Support
Account, according to which a belief in P is justified for S only if, given S’s
evidence E, there exists no normal world in which E and not-P obtain together.
More informally we might say that one is justified in believing P only if one’s
evidence does not contain any information that would explain why one might falsely
believe that P.
At this point it is worth pointing out an important feature of the Normic Support
Account: whether a belief is normically supported by the evidence is logically
independent of P’s degree of probability. In other words, the two notions—normic
support and high probability—come apart. This turns out to be less mysterious than
it may initially appear. Consider the belief that one’s ticket in a very large lottery is
going to lose—while the belief is highly probable, it wouldn’t call for a special
explanation if it turned out to be false. Hence, lottery beliefs and other beliefs based
on purely statistical evidence fail to be justified on the Normic Support Account.10
These considerations point towards a more general consequence of the Normic
Support Account, namely that it is possible for a belief to be overwhelmingly
probable on the evidence and yet fail to be justified.11 As we will see this
insensitivity to probabilistic considerations will turn out to be problematic for the
Normic Support Account.
4 The easy-defeat problem
4.1 An initial skeptical worry
One might worry that denying the justificatory status of lottery beliefs, or beliefs
based on statistical evidence more generally, exposes the Normic Support Account
to a skeptical threat. After all, haven’t Vogel (1990, 1999) and Hawthorne (2004)
given us compelling reasons to think that many of the propositions we believe entail
lottery propositions? If lottery propositions fail to be justified on the Normic
Support Account, and Hawthorne and Vogel are correct that many ordinary beliefs
entail lottery propositions, then the Normic Support Account is threatened to be
undermined by skeptical worries.
To make this worry more concrete, consider the following examples.
(a) That Donald Trump is the current president of the United States entails that
Donald Trump did not suffer from fatal heart attack within the last few
minutes.
10 Since many have the intuition that the belief that one will not win the lottery is justified, we could
consider this a strike against the Normalcy View. However, I am not interested in the justificatory status
of lottery beliefs here.
11 Likewise it is possible for a belief to be highly improbable on the evidence and yet to be normically
supported by the evidence. One example comes from Smith’s analysis of the preface paradox. Smith
argues that the author’s belief that the book is error-free, despite being highly improbable, can
nevertheless be normically supported by the evidence.
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(b) That I will be able to cook dinner later entails that there will not be a power
outage in my neighborhood.
(c) That I am correct in believing that the New York Knicks beat the Boston
Celtics last night after reading it in the newspaper entails that the newspaper
did not misprint the scores.
Note that these entailments appear relevantly similar to lottery propositions in that
they are (a) statistically very likely but (b) don’t have any special evidence in their
support. Since the Normic Support Account denies that high probability is sufficient
for justification, one might worry that it will end up having to deny that we can
justifiably believe that Donald Trump is the current president of the United States,
that one will be able to cook dinner later, or that the New York Knicks beat the
Boston Celtics last night. Similar lottery-like entailments can of course be found for
almost any propositions. How can proponents of the Normic Support Account
respond to this skeptical challenge?
Fortunately, Smith offers what I take to be a compelling response. In short, he
tries to break the supposed symmetry between these lottery-like entailment
proposition and genuine lottery propositions. The thought is the following: while
for genuine lottery beliefs, e.g. the belief that my lottery ticket is going to lose, it
would not call for a special explanation if the belief turned out to be false, for
lottery-like propositions it would call for a special explanation if they were false.
My response to the skeptical problem is perhaps not as definitive as one might
wish—but I want to suggest that the analogy between genuine lottery
propositions and lottery-like propositions is simply not as close as Hawthorne
suggests…. If the president died within the last five minutes, or there is a
power outage in my neighborhood, or the scores in the newspaper are in error,
there would have to be some explanation as to how such things came about…
This is a significant disanalogy with genuine lottery propositions (Smith 2016:
57–58).
A different way of making Smith’s point is to say that while for genuine lottery
propositions, given the evidence, there always exists a normal world in which one’s
belief is false, for lottery-like propositions such as the ones considered above, there
does not exist a normal world in which they are false. As a result one would lack
justification for believing that one’s lottery ticket is a loser but one would be
justified in believing that Trump has not recently suffered a fatal heart attack and
that he is the current president of the United States. Thus, the skeptical threat of
traditional Hawthorne/Vogel lottery variants is avoided.
However, in what follows I argue that the notion of defeat that falls out of the
Normic Support Account gives rise to a new skeptical challenge—one which is not
so easily avoided.
4.2 The easy-defeat problem
Recall that according to the Normic Support Account, a belief that P is justified only
if the evidence E normally supports P, i.e. only if all of the worlds in which E is true
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are worlds in which P is true. It follows that justification is defeated as soon as a
piece of evidence establishes the existence of a single normal E & not-P world. In
these cases it would no longer call for an explanation if the belief turned out to be
false, because a world in which P is false is compatible with one’s body of evidence.
From this we can construct the following account of Normic Defeat.
Normic Defeat (ND) S’s justification for believing P is defeated if given a new
piece of evidence D, there exists at least one normal world in which E is true and P
is false.
(ND) is a non-probabilistic account of defeat and the fact that non-probabilistic
accounts of justification will generate non-probabilistic accounts of defeat is not
surprising. However, non-probabilistic accounts of defeat like (ND) do have
surprising consequences: since the Normic Support Account is entirely insensitive
to probabilistic considerations there is nothing that prevents minimal probability
possibilities, i.e. possibilities that are overwhelmingly improbable, from acting as
defeaters. As soon as a piece of evidence establishes the existence of just one
normal E & not-P world, no matter how remote the probability that this world is the
actual world, justification for P is lost.
In this regard, the normic support framework departs considerably from that of
standard threshold accounts on which defeating evidence needs to be sufficient to
bring a belief’s degree of probability below the threshold required for justification.
According to (ND) however, for a piece of evidence to defeat P’s justificatory status
it is not necessary that it makes the possibility of being in an E & not-P world even
remotely probable; all it needs to do is introduce a single E & not-P world into the
sphere of most normal E worlds.
This should provide some initial reason for concern. If all that is required for
justification to be defeated is for some evidence to introduce the existence of just
one normal E & not-P world, no matter remote the probability that this world is the
actual world, then one might worry that defeat simply comes too easily on the
normalcy view. This problem—let’s call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—has some
unattractive and costly consequences.
We can illustrate the Easy-Defeat Problem by slightly augmenting traditional
Vogel/Hawthorne style lottery variants.
Allergy Helen is allergic to peanuts. She goes to a cafe´ and orders a brownie
labeled ‘peanut free’. Based on this Helen is justified in believing P, that the
brownie is safe to eat. On the Normalcy View this entails that there does not exist a
single normal world in which Q, the brownie has been contaminated by something
containing peanuts. After ordering the brownie Helen sees a news paper headline
that reads D, international flour supplier admits to having accidently put 1 bag of
peanut-contaminated baking flour into circulation.
Allergy differs from standard lottery-like cases in that it does not just raise to
salience the plain possibility of error, i.e. that there is always a small chance that
even a brownie labeled ‘peanut-free’ might turn out to be contaminated. Instead it
goes one step further and provides, through additional evidence D, an explanation
for why Helen’s belief that her brownie is safe to eat may be false. It is this
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additional piece of evidence that makes it an augmented case of its more traditional
counterparts. I assume that in Allergy we would still want to say that Helen is
justified in believing that her brownie is safe to eat and that D is not sufficient to
defeat the justificatory status of Helen’s belief; after all we do not ordinarily assign
such seemingly negligible evidence this kind of defeating power. However, as I will
argue now, the Normic Support Account will not deliver this result.
In order for Helen to be justified in believing P, that her brownie is safe to eat,
there must not exist a single normal world in which Helen, given her total body of
evidence, falsely beliefs that P. Since a world in which Q is true would be such a
world, in order for Helen’s belief in P to be justified there cannot exist a single
normal world in which Q obtains, i.e. there cannot exist a single normal world in
which Helen’s brownie has been contaminated. An important question then is
whether given Helen’s total body of evidence E, which now includes D, the
information about the 1 contaminated bag of flour, there exists at least one normal
world in which Helen’s brownie is contaminated.
It seems plausible that such a world does exist—this of course is the world in
which the 1 bag of contaminated flour just so happened to end up in the cafe´ at
which Helen just ordered her brownie. Given Helen’s evidence there seems to be
nothing strange or abnormal about this possibility. In the end the bag of
contaminated flour must have ended up somewhere and there does not appear to
be anything particularly abnormal about it having ended up in the cafe´ where Helen
just bought her brownie than in any other cafe´. It might of course be less probable
that it would end up in some cafe´ rather than others—after all, some cafes will go
through a lot more flour than others—but recall that the normalcy account ignores
probabilistic considerations of this kind. So, given Helen’s total body of evidence it
seems plausible that there does exist a normal world in which Helen’s brownie has
been contaminated. As a result, Helen’s belief that her brownie is safe to eat fails to
be normically supported by the evidence and subsequently fails to be justified on the
Normic Support Account. A problematic prediction.
It is of course easy to generate more of these cases. Consider the following
example.
Lightning A few days ago Helen has made plans with her friend Bob to visit him
in Oxfordshire next weekend. Based on this Helen is justified in believing P, that she
will see Bob next weekend. On the Normalcy View this entails that there does not
exist a single normal world in which Q, Bob has been fatally struck by lightning. As
Helen is thinking about her upcoming trip to Oxfordshire she reads a newspaper
headline stating D, man in Oxfordshire fatally struck by lightning.
The worry is the same as in the previous case. In light of D, a seemingly negligible
piece of evidence, it appears that Helen’s belief is no longer normically supported
by the evidence. Why? Consider the following question: Given Helen’s total
evidence, does there exists at least one normal world in which her belief that she
will see Bob next weekend is false? Again it seems plausible that such a world
exists—this of course is the world in which the man fatally struck by lightning just
happened to be Bob. Given that Helen knows that a man was fatally struck by
lightning, there does not appear to be anything terribly abnormal about the possible
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world in which this person was Bob. Again, it is of course highly unlikely that Bob
was struck by lightning, but recall that this is irrelevant on the Normic Support
Account—what matters is whether it would be abnormal on the evidence, and that it
ultimately isn’t. Thus, we have good reasons for thinking that after learning D
Helen’s belief that the she will see her friend Bob next weekend is no longer
normically supported by the evidence and subsequently fails to be justified. Another
problematic result.
These two cases illustrate a general structural problem with the Normic Support
Account—namely that negligible pieces of evidence can have serious defeating
power. The heart of the Easy-Defeat Problem, to reiterate, is that according to the
Normalcy View the introduction of a single normal E & not-P world is sufficient for
defeat—no matter how remote the probability that it is the actual world. Additional
cases illustrating this problem can easily be generated using the following recipe:
First, chose a proposition P that is justified for S. Next, chose a proposition Q that is
entailed by P. Finally, introduce a new piece of evidence D, such that (i) D provides
an explanation for why Q might obtain and (ii) Q remains so overwhelmingly
improbable that we judge D insufficient to defeat P’s justificatory status.
4.3 The easy-defeat problem’s implications
Why is the Easy-Defeat Problem bad news for the Normic Support Account? First,
as the cases above illustrate, the problem of easy defeat shows that the account has
counterintuitive implications. For instance, in Allergy we would not ordinarily
consider the fact that 1 bag of contaminated flour has accidentally been put into
circulation sufficient to defeat Helen’s justification for believing that her brownie is
safe to eat. We might accept that in light of such evidence Helen should slightly
lower her confidence in P, but we would not accept that the evidence is anywhere
near sufficient for defeat. More generally, we do not tend to assign defeating powers
to highly improbable error possibilities. A plausible explanation for our reluctance
to accept the normalcy view’s defeat predictions might be that we generally expect
an undermining defeater to make the falsity of a belief sufficiently probable—
merely establishing that it would not be entirely abnormal if the belief turned out to
be false seems to set the bar for defeat problematically low. Thus, if the Normic
Support Account is to be understood as a descriptive account, i.e. an account that
adequately captures our ordinary concept of justification, then the account fails; for
in at least some cases—those involving low probability defeaters—its predictions
systematically diverge from our ordinary judgments. If on the other hand the
Normic Support Account is supposed to be prescriptive, i.e. an account about how
we should think about justification rather than how we do think about justification,
then one would have to argue that the account’s counterintuitive easy-defeat
predictions are virtues rather than vices of the view. Making this conclusion
palatable however will not be an easy task.
Alternatively, we can give a diagnosis of the problem in terms of Ichikawa’s
notion of stinginess. In recent work, Ichikawa (2014) made explicit what is often
taken for granted, namely that one condition any plausible theory of justification
needs to satisfy is that it is not ‘too stingy’. According to Ichikawa, an account of
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justification is too stingy if, ‘‘it denies justificatory status to too many beliefs that are
intuitively justified’’ (186). What the Easy-Defeat Problem demonstrates is that by
predicting defeat too readily the Normic Support Account systematically violates
this plausible stinginess constraint.
To make matters worse, there are good reasons for thinking that instances of the
Easy-Defeat Problem, like Lightning or Allergy, are not far-fetched isolated cases,
but that we find ourselves in these kinds of epistemic situations frequently. This is
the case because we frequently come across information that provides a possible
explanation for why many of our beliefs may be false. Put differently, we frequently
come across information that introduces, for a considerable number of beliefs, a
small number of normal worlds in which the belief is false. Just consider the
ubiquity of information like the following: ‘Devastating fire in New York City
apartment’, ‘Contaminated eggs discovered in supermarkets’, ‘Fatal hit and run in
central London’, ‘Shark attack off the coast of Australia’, ‘Plane crash over the
Atlantic, or ‘In very rare cases (1 in 100,000) this medication has been linked to
anxiety and depression’. Since evidence of this kind provides an explanation for
why one might falsely belief that one still has an apartment in New York City, that
one’s friends who live in London are alive and well, that one’s cousin who lives in
Australia and enjoys an occasional swim has not fallen victim to a shark attack, or
that ones allergy medication will make one feel better rather than worse, these
beliefs would fail to be justified on the Normic Support Account. Moreover, one
would also lose justification for any proposition entailed by these beliefs. So, the
epistemic consequences of the Easy-Defeat Problem are much more expansive and
far-reaching than initially thought. Of course the falsity of any of these beliefs is
highly improbable, but recall that the Normic Support Account is not sensitive to
probabilistic considerations. Thus, the Normic Support Account combined with the
fact that we frequently acquire evidence that provides an explanation for why some
of our beliefs might be false entails that we lack justification for a great many beliefs
that we ordinarily take to be justified.
The Easy-Defeat Problem then poses a two-pronged challenge against the
Normic Support Account. In a first instance it gives rise to straightforward
counterexamples to the view. And secondly, it reintroduces skeptical worries, which
Smith tried to avoid.
4.4 Anticipating a response
A perhaps initially compelling response to the Easy-Defeat Problem might be to
deny that in cases like Allergy, Lightning, or any of the other examples, there really
does exist a normal world in which these beliefs are false—let’s call this the Denial
Strategy. However, I think there are good reasons to be skeptical about this strategy.
Recall that within the normalcy framework the notion of normality is explained via
the notion of ‘calling for explanation’: for any proposition P and body of evidence
E, there does not exist a normal world in which P is false, only if, given E it would
require an explanation if P were false. Since in Allergy, Lightning, and the other
examples we considered, the evidence does contain an explanation for why the
relevant belief that P may be false—after all, in both cases, D provides a reason for
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thinking (or suspecting) that P may be false—it seem natural to assume that in these
cases it would no longer call for a explanation if P turned out to be false. The
principle underlying this thought is the following.
Explanation If one’s body of evidence E contains an explanation for why P may
turn out to be false, then it would no longer call for explanation if P turned out to be
false.
So, if we accept Explanation, then in Allergy, Lightning, etc., there does exist a
normal world in which P is false. This means that proponents of the Denial Strategy
will need to reject Explanation. Explanation however seems very plausible and it is
difficult to see on what grounds one might deny it. In any case, until a convincing
argument against Explanation has been produced the Denial Strategy does not look
like a promising response to the Easy-Defeat Problem.12
In the next two sections I consider the second leading Normalcy View—viz.
Leplin’s Normic Reliabilism—and whether it is able to avoid the Easy-Defeat
Problem. Ultimately I conclude that it cannot.
12 I thank an anonymous referee for the interesting observation that Explanation may have the
unintended, and perhaps problematic consequence, of not just explaining why, on the Normic Support
Account, we lack justification in easy defeat cases like Lightning and Allergy but that it may also provide
reasons for thinking that we lack justification in lottery-like cases discussed earlier.
The reviewer considers the following lottery-like case. Suppose I am justified in believing P, that I will
cook dinner tonight. On the Normic Support Account this entails that I also need to be justified in
believing Q, that there will not be a power outage tonight. Initially, we may think that this is
unproblematic, because if Q turned out to be false and there was in fact a power outage tonight, then this
would be abnormal or call for explanation. However, many of us who are justified in believing Q will also
be justified in believing R, that sometimes trees fall on power lines and cause power outages. At this
point, the referee suggests that one might think that R provides an explanation for why Q may turn out to
be false. If this analysis is correct, then according to Explanation it would no longer call for a special
explanation if Q was false and subsequently Q as well as P—since P entails Q—would fail to be justified
on the Normic Support Account. This result would not just be bad news for the Normic Support Account,
as lottery-like cases would present a more serious objection to the Normic Support Account than initially
thought, but it would also mean that there is a tension between Explanation and the previous concession
that the Normic Support Account can straightforwardly deal with the skeptical threat posed by lottery-like
scenarios (Sect. 4.1). How can this tension be dissolved?
Even though Smith never gives a detailed analysis of the notion of calling for an explanation or what it
is to have an explanation for something—that was Anderson’s (2017) primary criticism of the Normic
Support Account (see footnote 9)—it seems there is room to plausibly deny that R does in fact provide an
explanation for why Q may be false. Here is how we may motivate this position in a way that I take to be
in line with how Smith seems to think about these cases. In lottery-like cases—like the one suggested by
the reviewer—the subject lacks any specific (or positive) evidence for thinking that in this instance their
belief may actually be false. Put differently, in lottery-like cases the subject lacks any reason for thinking
that the disobliging environmental conditions, which would make them falsely believe that P, may
actually obtain. In this regard lottery-like cases differ from easy-defeat cases, in which D provides a
specific reason for thinking (or suspecting) that Helen’s belief that P may be false, or that the disobliging
environmental conditions that would make her falsely believe that P may actually obtain. Hence, it seems
that we can reasonably deny that R, on its own, provides an explanation for why Q may be false.
Acknowledging Smith’s (2016: 57) remark that his response to the skeptical threat posed by lottery-
like cases is not as definitive as one might wish, I think that this is a prima facie plausible and
charitable way of thinking about explanations that would (1) preserve the idea that the Normic Support
Account is compatible with justification for lottery-like propositions and (2) dissolve the alleged tension
between Explanation and justification in lottery-like propositions.
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5 Normic reliabilism
Recall that according to Leplin, a belief is justified only if it was formed by a
method that is perfectly reliable under normal conditions and one has no reason to
believe that conditions are abnormal. To see what he has in mind, consider again
some paradigmatic instances of justified beliefs. If a belief based on perception were
to be false, then, so the thought goes, under normal conditions perception would not
have produced the belief—hence, the belief is prima facie justified. What does it
mean for conditions to be normal according to Leplin?
Unlike Smith, who cashes out normalcy via a metaphysical relation (the ‘calling
for an explanation’ relation) between a body of evidence and a proposition, Leplin
explains normalcy in terms of the conditions we naturally presuppose when using
certain belief forming methods: ‘‘conditions normal for a method are conditions
typical or characteristic of occasions and environments in which the method is usable
or applicable’’ (37). For instance, in cases of perception, we presuppose the absence of
trick mirrors, barn facades, and deceptive lighting. Likewise, in cases of testimony we
must presuppose the sincerity of the testifier, proper hearing, etc. (40). One could of
course easily extend this list of natural presuppositions to include the absence of
sudden power outages, barn facades, peanut-contaminated baking flour, dubious pills,
etc. Importantly, it is these natural presuppositions which ensure that our belief-
forming methods are perfectly reliable. This explains why, besides requiring a belief-
forming method to be perfectly reliable under normal conditions, justification also
requires that the believer has no reason for believing that conditions are abnormal, i.e.
that any of the natural presuppositions are violated; for in abnormal conditions a
method’s perfect reliability across modal space is no longer guaranteed.
In what follows I will argue that Normic Reliabilism, like the Normic Support
Account, faces the problem of easy defeat.
6 The easy-defeat problem strikes again
6.1 Lottery skepticism
One unsurprising consequence of Normic Reliabilism is that like the Normic
Support Account it denies the justificatory status of beliefs based on purely
statistical evidence, e.g. lottery beliefs. After all, in the case of lotteries for instance
one knows that the method by which one comes to believe that one’s ticket is a loser
is not perfectly reliable; in a world in which one happens to hold the winning ticket
one would nevertheless believe that one’s ticket is a loser. This once again raises the
issue of Hawthorne/Vogel style lottery skepticism: If Normic Reliablism denies
justification in lottery propositions but many ordinary beliefs entail lottery
propositions, then hardly any of our beliefs would be justified. However, like
Smith, Leplin offers a response to the standard Hawthorne/Vogel skeptical
challenge: Leplin, like Smith, denies the symmetry between genuine lottery-
propositions and propositions that are merely lottery-like. While Smith distinguishes
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genuine lottery propositions from lottery-like propositions via the notion of ‘calling
for an explanation’, for Leplin the relevant difference is that in genuine lottery cases
it is guaranteed that the employed belief-forming method will produce a false belief,
while in lottery-like case there is no such guarantee (2009: 104). So, while in
genuine-lottery cases we know that there exists a possible world in which we falsely
belief that our ticket is a loser, the belief-forming method that produce lottery-like
beliefs (e.g. that Donald Trump has not recently suffered a heart attack) may well be
perfectly inerrant across modal space. For this reason we lack justification for
believing genuine lottery proposition while beliefs in lottery-like proposition can be
justified. So, traditional Hawthorne/Vogel lottery skepticism is avoided. However,
as we will see, Normic Reliabilism too is committed a notion of epistemic defeat on
which seemingly irrelevant pieces of evidence are sufficient for defeat. Again this
gives rise to a new skeptical threat.
6.2 The easy-defeat problem returns
Recall that according to Normic Reliabilism, for a belief to be justified it is
necessary that it is reliably produced. And a belief is reliably produced only if it is
produced by a belief-forming method M that is perfectly reliable under normal
conditions and the believer has no reason to believe that conditions are abnormal. It
follows that the justificatory status of a belief is defeated as soon as the agent has
reason for believing that conditions are abnormal. This is the case because under
abnormal conditions, i.e. when any of the presuppositions that ensure a method’s
perfect reliability are violated, a method’s perfectly reliability across modal space is
no longer guaranteed. These considerations give rise to the following account of
defeat for Normic Reliabilism.
Normic Reliabilism Defeat (NRD) S’s justification for believing P is defeated if,
given a new piece of evidence D, the believer has reason for believing that
conditions are (or were) abnormal—i.e. if the believer has reason for believing D
and D violates any of the presupposition which ensure that the belief-forming
method M which produced P is (or was) perfectly reliable across modal space.
Note the strength of the account. Since Normic Reliabilism demands nothing short
of perfect reliability, having reason to believe that any of the reliability ensuring
presuppositions has been violated is sufficient for defeat—even if the belief-forming
method remains highly reliable. More precisely, justification is defeated according
to (NRD) if one has reason to believe that there exists just a single world in which
the method would produce or sustain a false belief. This gives rise to the same
concerns previously raised for the Normic Support Account: Seeing that the account
is entirely insensitive to probabilistic considerations, nothing prevents possibilities
that are overwhelmingly improbable from having serious defeating powers. This of
course is just the Easy-Defeat Problem all over again.13
13 For a brief discussion about Leplin’s requirement of perfect reliability perhaps being too strict, see
Christensen (2007).
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To illustrate, consider what normic reliabilism would predict in response to the
augmented lottery variants considered earlier. In Allergy, Helen formed the belief
that the brownie is safe to eat based on the fact that it was clearly labeled ‘peanut-
free’. Let’s assume that under normal conditions this belief forming method is
perfectly reliable and one of the natural presuppositions that ensures Helen’s
method is reliable is something along the lines of, ‘brownies labeled peanut-free
will not be contaminated’.14 However, in Allergy Helen has reason to believe that
this presuppositions has been violated or that conditions are abnormal: Knowing
that there is a bag of contaminated flour in circulation gives Helen reason to believe
that her belief-forming method is no longer perfectly reliable or inerrant across
modal space. Thus, in Allergy Helen would lack justification for believing that her
brownie is safe to eat. The same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to
Lightning. In order for Helen’s belief forming method (whatever it may be in this
case) to be perfectly reliable, we must presuppose that people do not normally get
struck by lightning. However, the evidence D, that a man in Oxfordshire has been
fatally struck by lightning provides reason to believe that in this case the
presupposition has been violated, i.e. that conditions are abnormal; for D provides
reason to believe that Helen’s belief forming method is no longer perfectly reliable
across modal space. Helen will falsely belief that she will see her friend Bob next
weekend in the world in which Bob happened to be the man in Oxfordshire who was
struck by lightning. Hence, Helen’s belief that she will see Bob next weekend fails
to be justified on Leplin’s account. The Easy-Defeat Problem has returned.
Recall that the problem of easy defeat presents a two-pronged challenge. First it
exposes Normic Reliabilism to straightforward counterexamples in which the
justificatory status of beliefs ordinarily take to be justified is denied. And second it
opens the door to skeptical a skeptical threat: Normic Reliabilism combined with
the fact that we frequently acquire reasons for believing that our belief-forming
methods are not perfectly reliable across modal space, yields the unpalatable con-
clusion that justified beliefs are a lot more scarce than we ordinarily think.
As we have seen, the two leading Normalcy Views—the Normic Support
Account and Normic Reliabilism—both face the problem of easy defeat. On both
accounts insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating
powers. This makes the accounts overly stingy, leads to counterexamples, and
exposes them to skeptical threats, which both Smith and Leplin were hoping to
avoid. Is there a way around the Easy-Defeat Problem? In the next section I propose
modifications to the two accounts that would allow them to avoid the Easy-Defeat
Problem. However, we will see that the required modifications will fail to save the
accounts.
14 Leplin acknowledges that it is difficult to specify exactly the conditions under which a certain belief
forming method is perfectly inerrant (41). This difficulty becomes apparent here, for it is not at all clear
how the content of the relevant presupposition should be formulated. Considering that these
presuppositions play a crucial role in Leplin’s theory, we might worry that without a method for
specifying their content his account remains somewhat incomplete. However, for current purposes I will
ignore any difficulties surrounding this issue.
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7 Can the easy-defeat problem be avoided?
What got the Normic Support Account into trouble is that in order for a belief in P to
be justified, P must be true in all normal E worlds. As far as I can see the only way
to avoid the problem of easy defeat is to weaken the notion of normic support so that
it can accommodate a small number of normal worlds in which P is false. A
straightforward way of achieving this goal would be to concede that in order to be
normically supported by the evidence a belief that P must be true not in all but only
in nearly all normal E worlds. Weakening normic support’s modal strength in this
way yields the following Weak Normic Support Account.
Weak Normic Support Account (WNSA) In order for one to have justification
for believing a proposition P, it is necessary that one’s body of evidence E
normically support P—it is necessary that nearly all of the most normal worlds in
which E is true are worlds in which P is true.
Similarly, what gets Normic Reliabilism into the problem of easy defeat is that in
order for a belief to be reliably produced it is necessary that (i) the belief-forming
method is perfectly reliable under normal conditions, and that (ii) the believer has
no reason to believe that conditions are abnormal. As we have seen (ii) can easily be
violated by seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence because according to the
Normic Reliabilism one has reason to believe that conditions are abnormal as soon
as one has reason to believe that any of the presuppositions that ensure a belief
forming method’s perfect reliability across modal space have been violated. To
avoid this problem we can weaken (ii) so that if the believer has reason to believe
that conditions are abnormal justification can be retained if the believer also has
reason to believe that the relevant belief-forming method remains highly reliable.
This weakened version of Normic Reliabilism can be expressed as follows.
Weak Normic Reliabilism (WNR) In order for S to have justification for
believing a proposition P, it is necessary that S’s belief was reliably produced—it is
necessary that (i) the belief that P was produced by a belief-forming method M that
would not, in any normal world, have produced the belief that P if P were false and
(ii) that the believer has no reason to believe that conditions are abnormal or if the
believer has reason to believe that conditions are abnormal, it is reasonable to
assume that the method remains highly reliable across modal space.
These weakened versions of the Normic Support Account and Normic
Reliabilism are able to avoid the Easy-Defeat Problem. Consider for instance what
(WNSA) and (WNR) would predict in Allergy. Despite the fact that Helen’s
evidence is compatible with a few normal worlds in which her brownie is
contaminated and therefore not safe to eat, it will nevertheless remain the case that
in nearly all E-worlds P is true. So, according to (WNSA) Helen’s belief would be
justified. Similar considerations apply to (WNR). Even though Helen has reason to
believe that conditions are abnormal—after all one of the presuppositions that
ensure her belief-forming method’s perfect reliability across modal space has been
violated—she also has reason to believe that her belief-forming method will remain
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highly reliable as the number of worlds in which she falsely believes that her
brownie is safe to eat is very small. Analogous considerations apply in the case of
Lightning. Given Helen’s total evidence, her belief that she will see Bob next
weekend, while not true in all normal worlds, will nevertheless be true in nearly all
normal worlds. So, according to (WNSA) Helen would be justified in believing that
she will see Bob next weekend. Again, similar considerations apply in the case of
(WNR). Even though Helen has reason to believe that one of the presuppositions
ensuring her belief-forming method’s perfect reliability has been violated, she also
has reason to believe that the method by which she came to believe that she will see
Bob next weekend will remain highly reliable across modal space. So, according to
(WNR) her belief will be justified. Thus, the weakened versions of the two accounts
appear to deliver the intuitively correct results and avoid the Easy-Defeat Problem.
However, while initially promising, there are good reasons for being suspicious of
the weakened accounts.
(WNSA) and (WNR) essentially mark a return to a threshold conception of
justification. An indication of this collapse into threshold views is the ‘nearly all’
quantifier in (WNSA) and the appearance of ‘highly reliably’ in (WNR). One
consequence of this is that the weakened accounts are no longer instances of
Normalcy Views—they betray (NT). A related second consequence is that like all
threshold views (for t\ 1), the weakened accounts face the problem of risk
accumulation over conjunctions. This means that (WNSA) and (WNR), unlike their
stronger counterparts, will not be compatible with (MPC). This is problematic
because it was the promise of preserving (MPC) that was the primary motivation for
the two accounts. Without preserving (MPC) the accounts become unmotivated.
It appears then that the Normic Support Account and Normic Reliabilism face a
dilemma: The original accounts, which are committed to (NT), face the Easy-Defeat
Problem, while the weaker versions, which by violating (NT) are able to avoid this
problem, collapse back into threshold views and therefore cannot make good on
their motivating promise of preserving (MPC). We may call this the Easy-Defeat
Dilemma.
Besides putting pressure on the Normic Support Account and Normic Reliabil-
ism, the above considerations also point towards a more general connection between
Normalcy Views and the Easy-Defeat Problem. As we have seen, what gets the two
leading Normalcy Views into trouble has little to do with any account-specific-
features (e.g. their respective notions of normality) and everything to do with a more
general feature of the views, namely their modal strength. Importantly, the modal
strength of Normalcy Views is not merely an optional feature of the views but
instead it is required to make good on the promise of preserving (MPC)—after all
the problem of risk accumulation needs to be avoided. In other words, the modal
strength of (NT), which is directly responsible for the Easy-Defeat Problem, is an
essential feature of Normalcy Views of justification. As a result, we can expect the
problem to generalize to any Normalcy View—i.e. to any account of justification
committed to (NT)—regardless of how the details are developed. What does this
mean for the general prospects of Normalcy Views? Well, in so far as we take
seriously the idea that justification should be sufficiently robust and be able to
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survive small amounts of risk, we have good reasons to be skeptical about the
success of Normalcy Views.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have raised an objection against one broad family of non-probabilistic
accounts of justification. I argued that Normalcy Views of justification, i.e. accounts
of justification committed to (NT), whilst providing the perhaps most promising
framework for preserving (MPC), face a serious problem when it comes to the
notion of epistemic defeat.
First I showed that the two leading Normalcy Views—the Normic Support
Account and Normic Reliabilism—give rise to what I called the Easy-Defeat
Problem. Next I showed that the only way of avoiding this problem requires
weakening the modal strength of the accounts, which ultimately led to a violation of
(NT). Finally, I argued that there is little hope that other Normalcy Views will be
able to avoid this problem. This pessimism is justified by the fact that the Easy-
Defeat Problem, as we have seen, is not an incidental feature of the Normic Support
Account or Normic Reliabilism, but instead a more general, structural, problem
resulting from Normalcy Views’ modal strength.
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